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Susan Q. Wombwoman v. State of California 
hy Laura Weinstock * 
In a seminar I took on judicial process, we were asked to examine a 
"hypothetical" fact pattern and write a judicial opinion as if we were 
writing for the majority on the California Supreme Court. For the 
purpose of the assignment, we assumed that the California Legislature 
had amended the state child abuse statute, Penal Code section 273(a), to 
include fetuses. A woman who was both pregnant and abusing cocaine 
was prosecuted under this amended statute and I, as the court, had to 
decide on appeal whether the amended statute was constitutional. 
The following opinion reflects my dissatisfaction with current equal 
protection and privacy doctrine analysis, especially in the area of 
reproduction. Although this particular fact pattern was created for the 
classroom, it is far from "hypothetical." Women's reproductive rights 
are being increasingly curtailed in the name of fetal rights. Indeed, fetal 
rights legislation has resulted in such intrusive control over women's 
lives that one can not help but wonder whether this control over women 
via their reproductive abilities is the masked intention of the proponents 
of these laws. How much better off the world would be if the Supreme 
Court produced opinions such as the one that follows. 
SUSAN Q. WOMB WOMAN, 
Appellant, 
v. 




The facts of the case at issue are uncontested. The State of 
California brought suit against appellant for violation of the recently 
amended California felony child abuse statute, Penal Code section 
* The author graduated from Cornell University in 1982. She lived in Central and South 
America for two years and speaks fluent Spanish, Portuguese and French. She came to law 
school after working in the battered women and rape crisis movements and experiencing 
frustration, anger, and disbelief at the complete lack of justice women victims of sexual 
and physical violence receive in the courtroom. She plans to continue to work to end all 
oppressions and "isms" and hopes to practice employment discrimination law. She plays 
guitar and piano and wants to learn to play the flute and banjo. 
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'273(a).1 Appellant, a welfare recipient and cocaine addict, was eight 
months pregnant when she was arrested for possession of cocaine. 
When tested, traces of cocaine were found in her urine. Two months 
prior to the arrest, appellant's physician had warned her that continued 
use of the dr'ug would endanger the fetus's life. 
The trial court found appellant guilty of California felony child abuse 
due to her willful ingestion of cocaine with the full know ledge that it 
would harm her fetus. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. 
Appellant appeals on behalf of herself and all women, contesting the 
validity of the statute as violating women's rights to privacy and equal 
protection under the California Constitution. We reverse. 
The History of Fetal Rights Legislation 
We recognize that the expansion of legal protection afforded fetuses 
has been motivated by legitimate concerns. Through no fault of their 
own, increasing numbers of babies are being born with mental and 
physical defects due to their mothers' use of drugs or alcohol during 
pregnancy. Unfortunately, much of the recent legislation involving fetal 
protection has not analyzed how best to address these legitimate 
concerns. The drafters and proponents of fetal rights have not 
considered the long-term consequences of new legislation on women, as 
carriers and potential carriers of fetuses. 2 
Until recently, courts have been hesitant to grant fetuses legal rights 
except in narrowly defined instances where the rights were contingent 
upon a live birth.3 Thus, a fetus in existence when a testator died was 
considered a person for inheritance purposes, if it was subsequently 
born alive. Similarly, if a fetus was injured before birth, the 
subsequently born child was allowed a cause of action for its prenatal 
injuries. The fetus, in these circumstances, was not given any rights 
independent of its mother. At birth, it acquired rights to compensate the 
1. Section 273(a) states, "(I) any person, who under circumstances or conditions likely 
to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child [or fetus] to 
suffer, or having the care or custody of any child [or fetus], willfully causes or permits the 
person or health of such child [or fetus] to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such 
child [or fetus] to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endangered, is 
punishable by imprisonment .... CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (WEST 1988). 
2. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights 
to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1986). 
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-163 (1973). 
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live child and her or his parents. The fetus "as a fetus" was not 
protected by these laws.4 
Since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the law has increasingly 
granted fetal rights in circumstances not involving a live birth. Most 
states now consider fetuses to be persons in wrongful OOathclaims-er 
vehicular homicides. Such laws compensate the parents for losing their 
expected child and protect the mother who chooses to carry to term. 
Similarly, feticide laws protect pregnant women from violent attacks by 
third parties. All of these laws are favorable to the pregnant woman.s 
When laws recognize the fetus rather than the woman as possessing 
rights where there is no live birth, the situation changes dramatically. 
By granting rights to the fetus "as a fetus" and not simply to compensate 
the subsequently born child or its parents, laws create an opportunity for 
fetal rights to be used against pregnant women. We are confronted with 
this situation in the instant case, in which a child abuse statute has been 
amended to include fetuses, to the detriment of the women who carry 
them. 
The Statute Violates Women's Privacy Rights Under the 
California Constitution 
This court wrote in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. 
Myers6 that basic principles of federalism permit and encourage 
construction of state statutes under the state constitution. The federal 
Bill of Rights was patterned after pre-existing state constitutions and not 
the reverse. In fact, state constitutions were once seen as the only 
protection for individuals against local officials.7 By interpreting state 
constitutional guarantees, state courts fulfill their obligation to safeguard 
the rights of their citizens. In light of this obligation, we turn to the 
California Constitution to determine the validity of section 273(a). 
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution was amended by 
the people in 1972 to include the right to privacy as one of the 
inalienable rights afforded its citizens. Because the federal constitution 
does not explicitly mention the privacy right, this court has deemed the 
federal right to be narrower than the right granted by our state 
4. Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240 (1887); Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520 (1927); 
McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274 (1899); Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C. 537, 538 
(1927). 
5. Note, supra note 2, at 603. 
6. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261 (1981). 
7.Id. at 261. 
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constitution.S Included in the right to privacy is the fundamental right of 
procreative choice that this court recognized in People v. Belous9 four 
years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 
Because the California rights to privacy and procreative choice are 
fundamental rights, legislation that seeks to regulate these rights can 
only be upheld if it is narrowly drawn to foster compelling state 
interests. The state in the instant case asserts a compelling interest in 
protecting fetuses. However, the state, by imposing criminal penalties 
on pregnant women who injure their fetuses, has designed legislation 
that aims to protect fetuses by controlling the women who carry them. 
This violates women's fundamental constitutional right of procreative 
choice by severely restricting pregnant women's ability to control their 
bodies and daily lives during their pregnancies. Further, the statute 
does not seek to do this in the least intrusive manner, but seeks to 
incarcerate women, thereby completely impeding their ability to exercise 
their own fundamental rights. For this reason, section 273(a) fails to 
pass constitutional muster under the California right to privacy. 
Granting fetal rights that can be asserted against the mother would 
create an unprecedented intrusion on women's bodies and lives. The 
United States Supreme Court has long held that the right to privacy 
includes the right to be free from bodily intrusion. lO "No right is held 
more sacred, [nor] is more carefully guarded ... than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person. "11 
Even isolated attempts at intrusions, similar to those that pregnant 
women would be subjected to under section 273(a), have been declared 
unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court has held that states 
may not compel criminal suspects or involuntarily committed mental 
patients to undergo certain relatively minor and rapid medical 
procedures. 12 
Under the statute at issue, pregnant drug users would be forcibly 
detained for the length of their pregnancy and possibly longer. Clearly 
the privacy interest and expectation intruded upon by detaining a 
pregnant women for nine months are greater than those involved in the 
8. [d. at 262-263. 
9. 71 Cal. 2d 954 (1969). 
10. Note, supra note 2, at 615. 
11. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
12. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), the Court held that the forcible 
pumping of a criminal suspect's stomach violated his fourteenth amendment due process 
rights even though the police saw him swallow two pills that they believed were illegal 
drugs. In Winston v. Lee, 105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985), the Court held that the surgical removal 
of a bullet from a suspect's body against the suspect's will (when said bullet was used as 
evidence) was unconstitutional. Note, supra note 2, at 616. 
WOMB WOMAN V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 25 
thirty-minute procedure involved in the removal of bullets from a 
person's body. If the more limited federal privacy right protects 
individuals from relatively minor and short-term bodily intrusion and 
detention, the fundamental privacy right under the California 
Constitution clearly protects women from forced detainment during their 
pregnancies. 
Although the state argues it has a compelling interest in protecting 
potential human life, we are not persuaded that this statute is narrowly 
drawn to address this interest. There are less burdensome and more 
effective alternatives available to the state than imprisoning, policing, 
and monitoring pregnant women, such as education about the effects of 
drug use and drug rehabilitation programs. Furthermore, the woman 
has a fundamental right to be protected from state interference with her 
decisions involving childbearing. By restricting a pregnant woman's 
conduct in the guise of protecting a fetus, the state is appropriating her 
right to control her actions during pregnancy. 
Given the fetus's complete physical dependence on the woman's 
body, every conceivable act of the pregnant woman can adversely affect 
the fetus. Under section 273(a), women could be held criminally liable 
for fetal accidents resulting from maternal negligence, improper diet, 
exposure to infectious disease or workplace hazards, residence at high 
altitudes, airplane trips, immoderate exercise, or sexual intercourse. 
They would live in constant fear that any error in judgment might result 
in criminal (or civil) prosecution. To protect a fetus from a drug-
addicted mother such as the appellant, it would be necessary to detain 
the woman, severely threatening her constitutionally protected rights to 
autonomy and bodily integrity.13 
This impingement of the pregnant woman's autonomy is caused by 
ignoring both the purpose behind the historically narrow recognition of 
fetal rights and alternatives that would more appropriately protect the 
fetus. The original drafters of section 273(a) intended the statute to 
protect liveborn children who are susceptible to "care and custody."14 
By expanding the statute to cover fetuses in response to the public 
outcry against drug abuse, legislators have created an adversarial 
relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus that ultimately 
threatens rather than protects the fetus from this abuse. 
The threat of criminal prosecution and infringement of women's 
liberty will discourage women from becoming pregnant or carrying their 
pregnancies to term. To avoid these penalties, pregnant drug abusers, 
13. Note, supra note 2, at 608. 
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) notes 2, 4. 
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desperately in need of medical care, will refrain from seeking prenatal 
care altogether, endangering their own health as well as that of the fetus. 
In addition, state intrusion upon the mother's autonomy impairs 
important emotional bonds between the woman and her fetus. Mothers 
who are civilly Of criminally de-tained typically pass their sense of 
helplessness on to their fetuses. Often the distress has led to pregnancy 
disorders, stillbirth, and premature delivery.ls 
Because the woman and her fetus are physiologically and 
emotionally connected, the fetus's needs cannot be met if the needs of 
the mother are unmet. Pregnant drug users need help, not criminal 
sanctions. They need education about the effects of drugs and alcohol 
on their fetuses and they need rehabilitation to conquer their addictions. 
They also need counseling to explore the origins of their drug use. By 
providing these much needed services to pregnant drug users, states will 
avoid infringing upon women's constitutional rights and will better 
protect their fetuses. 
We are greatly dissatisfied with the privacy doctrine even under the 
California Constitution as a means of protecting women from 
discriminatory legislation. In Myers,16 the court held that once the 
legislature had agreed to fund medical services for poor women, it could 
not prevent them from exercising their constitutional rights by 
withholding these funds for abortions. In so holding, the court noted 
that poor women are effectively prevented from exercising their right to 
abortion, if they are not provided with funds to pay for them. 
However, it also stated that the legislature is not compelled to provide 
medical care to the poor in the first place. In other words, the privacy 
doctrine is not sufficient, in and of itself, to grant poor women the 
means to "effectively" exercise their right to abortion. 
Later in the opinion, the Myers court further demonstrated that 
women (including poor women) are not adequately protected by the 
privacy doctrine. The court noted that it was possible for the state to 
assert a compelling interest in protecting nonviable fetuses but that it 
could not do so by discriminating against poor women onlyP Since we 
are cognizant of class issues and how they operate to circumscribe 
women in need of abortions, we now recognize that the analysis in the 
Myers decision is defective. The logical consequence of such thinking 
15. Note, Less State Intervention and Greater State Assistance Equals Greater Maternal 
Rights and Less Prenatal Abuse, 1 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 129, 149 (1989). 
16. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 281 (1981). 
17.ld. 
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is to find that the state's right to favor fetuses over women may be 
upheld, so long as all women are discriminated against equally. 
Under the privacy doctrine, the state restrains itself from interfering 
with activities involving the home, marriage, and heterosexual sexuality. 
Its basic tenet is that autooomou:s individnaIs interact "freely and 
equally" as long as the government does not interfere. 18 Injuries do not 
occur within or because of the private sphere, but result when the state 
crosses the line and infringes on the private sphere. 
When this gender neutral analysis is replaced with a feminist 
critique, the inadequacies of the privacy doctrine in protecting women 
become clear. Women have not experienced autonomy in the private 
sphere; on the contrary, it is where they have been most oppressed. In 
the private sphere, women are exploited and devalued for their labor and 
experience marital rape and battery. By barring government interference 
in the private sphere, the privacy doctrine prevents women from 
changing their powerlessness in this sphere. "The existing distribution 
of power and resources within the private sphere will be precisely what 
the law of privacy exists to protect."19 
Since inequality is pervasive in the private sphere, women require 
intervention, not government restraint, to protect their rights. To fail to 
recognize this inequality is to give to men the right "to oppress women 
one at a time.,,2o Because we do not wish to perpetuate or reinforce this 
inequality, we find the privacy doctrine grossly inadequate to protect 
women and look to the equal protection clause instead. 
The Statute Violates Women's Equal Protection Rights 
Under the California Constitution 
Although the privacy doctrine recognizes that fetal rights laws 
threaten the autonomy of pregnant women, they do not address the sex-
specific nature of that threat. Only women suffer from such laws 
because only women can bear children. Laws that control pregnant 
women restrict women as women. They also penalize women because 
of their unique child-bearing ability, a characteristic that has historically 
been used to perpetuate sexual inequality.21 
The equal protection clause of the California Constitution protects 
women from sexual discrimination subject to the strict scrutiny 
18. C. ~ACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 99 (1987). 
19. Id. at 101. 
20. Id. at 102. 
21. See generally Note, supra note 2. 
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standard.22 Under traditional equal protection analysis, women are 
granted equal protection only to the extent that they are "similarly 
situated" to men. Because women are dissimilarly situated to men in 
issues involving pregnancy, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that pregnancy related discrimination is based on biological differences 
between the sexes and is not sex discrimination at all. 23 According to 
the Court, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not 
discriminate against women but only differentiates between pregnant 
and nonpregnant PEOPLE.24 
By dismissing sex discrimination claims where women and men are 
differently situated because of biological differences the Court evades 
the true purpose of equal protection: preventing the state from 
systematically using an immutable characteristic of a class of people as a 
basis for disadvantaging that class. Biological differences between 
women and men have historically been used to disadvantage women. In 
dismissing pregnancy discrimination claims from equal protection 
scrutiny, the Court rationalizes differential treatment as legitimate, 
instead of socially created.25 
State and social regulations regarding reproductive differences have 
created and reinforced separate and unequal sex-segregated spheres.26 
Men and male norms dominate the public sphere. Many women are 
relegated to the private sphere where they perform socially necessary but 
socially unrewarded childcare and housework. Conformity to sex roles 
has occurred through the imposing of social, economic, and legal 
constraints that often use women's reproductive ability as justification 
for their exclusion from the public sphere. 
The United States Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on the 
number of hours women could work because of a "public interest" in 
protecting the fetus. "The burdens necessarily borne by women for the 
preservation of the race" were used to justify women's exemption from 
22. Sail'er Inn, Inc v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20 (1971). The United States Supreme Court 
subjects sex discrimination claims to the less rigorous, intermediate scrutiny standard. 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
23. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
24. Note, supra note 2, at 622. Congress rejected the Supreme Court's conclusion in the 
employment setting by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act under Title VI, 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e(k) in 1978. The Act states that pregnancy discrimination in employment 
is sex-based discrimination. 
25. Note, supra note 2, at 622. 
26. [d. at 623. The concept of "separate but equal" was held unconstitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). If 
"separate but equal" is not tolerable because of the detrimental psychological effect 
(among other negative effects) it produces, we find it impermissible for laws contributing 
to "separate but UNeqUal" conditions to be upheld. 
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poll taxes if they decided not to vote.27 Women have been exempted 
from jury duty due to their "special responsibilities" in the home.28 The 
rationale for restricting women to the private sphere is strikingly similar 
to the rationale used by fetal rights legislation that "protects" the fetus 
by imprisoning the -woman wOO carries it. 
"Despite the [United States Supreme] Court's pronouncements to 
the contrary, laws that disadvantage PEOPLE on the basis of pregnancy 
disadvantage only WOMEN."29 For this reason, we hold that women 
are being denied equal protection of the laws under the California 
Constitution by the implementation of Section 273(a) which restricts, 
controls and imprisons only women during their pregnancies. Because 
traditional equal protection analysis perpetuates inequality between the 
sexes by requiring women to be similar to men (while men need not be 
similar to anyone in order to be entitled to their privileges) we are 
adopting a new equal protection analysis. 
Under this new analysis, equal protection doctrine in California will 
scrutinize all laws governing reproduction to ensure that "1) the law has 
no significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or 
culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom or 2) if the 
law has this impact, it is justified as the best means of serving a 
compelling state purpose. "30 It is clear that under this new approach, 
Section 273(a) fails to pass muster. The law perpetuates the oppression 
of women and culturally imposed sex-role constraints. It is clearly not 
the best means of achieving the state goals of protecting the fetus. 31 To 
the contrary, it leads to decreased protection of the fetus and of the 
woman who carries it. 32 
We recognize that judicial restraint demands adherence to the 
principles of stare decisis and judicial deference to the legislative branch. 
We have complied with our duties in this decision. First, we agree with 
the legal realists that society is in a state of flux and it typically moves 
27. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937). 
28. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). 
29. Note, supra note 2, at 624. 
30.Id. This analysis was suggested by Professor Sylvia Law, who also writes, "Given 
how central state regulation of biology has been to the subjugation of women, the normal 
presumption of constitutionality is inappropriate and the state should bear the burden of 
justifying its rule in relation to either proposition." Id. We hereby adopt her suggestion 
in this opinion. 
31. As discussed earlier in this opinion, education, counseling, and drug rehabilitation 
programs are all more effective and less intrusive means of protecting the unborn. 
32. Because we have overruled section 273(a) on equal protection and privacy grounds 
we do not need to discuss the constitutionality of punishing drug addicts for addictions 
that they cannot control without help and support. However, we do note that a majority of 
this court finds such punishment to be morally reprehensible. 
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more quickly than the law. Since laws are supposed to serve society, 
judges must frequently re-examine the laws that come before them to 
determine how adequately they are achieving this purpose.33 When a 
law is no longer appropriate (or is inappropriate from its inception), it is 
our duty to overrule it. Soch is the c-ase with theatmmled version of 
273(a). 
We agree with the critical legal scholars that neither the laws nor the 
judges who interpret them are value neutral. Legislative drafters and 
judicial interpreters alike have all of the racist, sexist, c1assist, 
homophobic and institutionally-imposed biases so prevalent in the rest 
of society. "Traditional jurisprudence largely ignores social and 
historical reality, and masks the existence of social conflict and 
oppression with ideological myths about objectivity and neutrality. The 
dominant system has been declared value free; it then follows that all 
others suffer from bias and can be thoughtlessly dismissed."34 
It is our duty therefore, to recognize our biases as well as the 
fundamental class, sex, and race conflicts in society and seek to 
eradicate, rather than perpetuate the oppression based on these 
conflicts.35 Although we are not an elected body of officials like the 
legislature, it has always been the solemn duty of the courts to protect 
disadvantaged groups which might not be protected sufficiently by 
officials concerned about re-election. 
This decision does not circumvent the will of either the citizens or 
the legislators of California. Since the 1970s both groups have striven 
to equalize the laws and the Constitution. In 1972, when privacy was 
added by California voters to article I, section 1 of the Constitution, they 
also substituted the word "people" for "men. "36 In 1975, the legislature 
passed the Family Law Act to bring state laws in line with changes 
33. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1236 (1931). 
34. D. KAIRYS, THEPOUfICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4 (1982). 
35. Because of the diversity of this Court it has been easier to examine our own biases 
and those which exist in the laws. We consider ourselves fortunate that the Court is 
comprised of Asian, Latin, Black, and Native American justices, that four out of seven of 
us are women, and that two of our members are openly gay. Former California Supreme 
Court Justice Grodin was also aware of the importance of a diverse court. In his book, In 
Pursuit of Justice, he writes, 
The diversity within our court ... made me realize that the significance of 
including women and minorities on a tribunal is much more than symbolic. 
Bird, Broussard and Reynoso brought to our discussions perspectives that went 
beyond my own experience; but even apart from anything they said, their very 
presence tended to heighten my own sensitivity toward those perspectives, and I 
believe the same was true for other judges as well. J. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE 58 (1989). 
36. CAL. CONST. art I, § 1. 
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brought about in the family by the women's movement. 37 Finally, 
virtually all wording in statutes and in the California Constitution have 
discarded the gender-biased "generic," he/him, for the gender inclusive 
he/she and him/her. This decision, therefore, merely extends the efforts 
toward gender equality already begun by Californians in their desire to 
eliminate all forms of oppression. 
In sum, we hold that section 273(a) of the California Penal Code as 
amended to include fetuses is unconstitutional under the California 
Constitution. It violates appellant's, as well as all women's rights to 
equal protection and privacy. We have now officially recognized the 
inadequacy of traditional privacy and equal protection analyses as 
applied to women's reproductive freedoms. Consequently, we have 
adopted a new equal protection approach designed to eradicate, rather 
than perpetuate, the oppression of women. Reversed and remanded for 
a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
37. West's Street Law 517 3d ed., (1987). 
